We present a dynamic duopoly model of technical innovation in which R&D costs decrease exogenously with time and inter-firm knowledge spillover lowers the second comer's R&D cost. The spillover effect only becomes available after a disclosure lag. These features allow us to identify a new type of equilibrium: the leader delays investment until the R&D cost is low enough that the follower finds it optimal to invest as soon as he can benefit from the spillover. This equilibrium is subgame perfect over a wide range of parameters and raises several interesting implications. First, in our new equilibrium, the time delay between the two R&D investments is realistically short. Second, while the presence of a spillover favors the second-mover, this benefit is not enough to rule out a first-mover advantage. Indeed, the first-mover advantage survives whenever technical progress is sufficiently fast and the disclosure lag is relatively long. Third, in case of a major innovation, our equilibrium implies under-investment, which requires a substantial public intervention in favor of the investment activity.
Introduction
The overall performance of an industry is deeply affected by its ability to innovate. It is therefore important to understand whether firms have a strong incentive to pioneer new technologies. In an oligopoly, the first-mover may obtain a competitive advantage such as lower production costs or a higherquality good. However, being first also involves high R&D cost and the risk of being overtaken by competitors in subsequent improvements. Moreover, the new technology may fail to generate profits or may provide unwanted knowledge spillover to other firms.
1 Hoppe (2000) addressed this question by analyzing a dynamic duopoly model similar to the classic Fudenb erg and Tirole's (1985) one. The main difference between their models is that Hoppe presumes the profitability of the new technology to be uncertain until the first-mover enters the market. Hence, this event produces some informational spillover. Because the follower decides whether to invest while being armed with better information, he or she may enjoy higher profits than the leader even when the ex ante probability that the new technology will perform poorly is low. Building on the work of Dutta et al. (1995) , Hoppe and LehmannGrube (2001) considered a vertically differentiated duopoly with sequential entry. In this setting, the second-mover chooses a higher quality level in hopes of servicing the richer part of the market and generating larger overall profits. This second-mover advantage substantiates in scenarios in which the R&D cost rapidly increases over time, so that the first-mover is likely to halt investment early and offer a low-quality good.
In our dynamic duopoly, firms have the option to obtain a process innovation. The required investment incorporates a significant amount of R&D expenditures, which, for simplicity, yields instantaneously the desired result. The investment cost shrinks over time thanks to general advances in knowledge and technology. The dynamics in the innovation cost implies the possibility of different entry dates for the leader and the follower. In fact, an earlier investment trades off higher profits with higher innovation costs, and this trade-off is usually different for the first and for the second innovators. The R&D outcomes are not fully appropriable: they generate an informational spillover that lowers the second comer's investment cost. In fact, every firm has only a limited ability to restrict the information flows provided by scientific publications, migration of employees, suppliers, and customers, and-in case of product innovation-through reverse engineering. Even if knowledge leaks out of the pioneer firm, the second comer takes time to exploit it. This means that the pioneer benefits from a time interval in which he or she is the unique appropriator of the R&D efforts.
2 Our model contemplates the presence of both a spillover and a lead time, which we label "disclosure lag".
We find that the presence of the disclosure lag implies that the spillover favoring the second-mover is not enough to offset the first-mover advantage (FMA) in most cases. 3 In fact, the disclosure lag bears strategic implications that need to be taken into account by the firms. Whenever the follower wants to exploit the spillover, the disclosure lag guarantees to the leader a temporary competitive advantage. Therefore, the leader enjoys a lead time but also pays R&D costs that are higher than the second comer's. The latter obtains lower profits while he has not introduced the process innovation, but benefits from the spillover. 4 The presence of an inter-firm technological spillover and of a disclosure lag in the dynamic game allows us to identify a new type of equilibrium: the leader delays her investment until the R&D cost is so low that the follower will find it optimal to invest as soon as he benefits from the spillover-that is, right at the end of the disclosure lag. Because the presence of a spillover deeply affects the firms' behavior, this is labeled the "spillover" equilibrium.
Notice that we focus on process innovation to favor the comparison with most of the literature, and to allow for a neat welfare analysis. Notice also that our framework bears significant similarities with the models rooted in the seminal contribution by Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) : according to that literature, a new technology may be introduced at a cost that decreases over time (refer, e.g., to Katz and Shapiro, 1987; Stenbacka and Tombak, 1994; Hoppe, 2000) . Differently from many of these papers, which interpret the technology upgrade as the adoption of an existing, and fully developed 2 The literature has labeled this competitive advantage period as "lead time". Recent studies highlight that it is perceived by firms as an important element determining the appropriability of R&D output. Cohen et al. (2002) , using the Canergie Mellon Survey on industrial R&D in U.S. manufacturing, assess that the lead time is the third most important factor guaranteeing the appropriability of R&D in case of process innovation (the two most important factors being secrecy and complementarities in the production process). More recently, Leiponen and Byma (2009) find that the benefits stemming from the disclosure lag are the main factor of R&D output appropriability for Finnish firms. 3 There is an FMA if the first-mover, choosing the innovation time that maximizes its payoff given the second-mover's optimal response, obtains the higher payoff. Instead, there is a second-mover advantage (SMA) if the leader maximum payoff is lower than the follower's. 4 For ease of exposition, we hereinafter refer to the follower as if it were headed by a male CEO and to the leader as if it were run by a female CEO. technique, 5 we underscore the role of R&D in the adaptation of new scientific results to the requirements of a specific process.
In his classic study, Mansfield (1985) reported that in 59% of cases the innovator's rivals need more than twelve months to obtain relevant information about the new technology. More recently, Cohen et al. (2002) computed that the average adoption lags for unpatented process innovations in Japan and the U.S. are 2.03 and 3.37 years, respectively. Some anecdotal evidence corroborates the importance of the disclosure lag. For example, aircraft engine manufacturing is dominated by three players: General Electric, Rolls Royce, and Pratt&Whitney. In this industry, each incremental technical advance introduced by one manufacturer is matched by the others within two years. (The Economist, January 10th, 2009, pp. 58-60) . In the microprocessor industry, AMD was two years behind Intel when it launched its version of the 80286 CPU in 1984, while AMD lagged by about four years in bringing a version of the 80486 to market. 6 Hence, disclosure lags represent an important feature of the competitive environment that deserves to be incorporated into a formal model.
The new equilibrium exists in addition to the preemption and simultaneous investment equilibria identified in contributions following Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) , and it has several interesting implications.
First, in our equilibrium the presence of a spillover favoring the secondmover is not enough to offset the FMA in all cases. The FMA survives when technical progress is sufficiently fast and the disclosure lag is relatively long. The follower incurs a lower R&D cost than the first-mover due to both technical progress and the spillover effect, but the difference between his costs and the leader's is limited by the fact that a high technical progress rate encourages the pioneer to wait until the R&D cost is low. An FMA is obtained when the extra profits obtained by the leader during the disclosure lag are greater than the difference in R&D costs. 7 This result helps to explain the pressure to 5 In Katz and Shapiro (1987) , the cost to introduce a new technology incorporates an important element of R&D. In one of their scenarios, when the leader introduces a new technology, the follower can immediately imitate the pioneer's decision, incurring in a cost that is a fraction of the original one. Accordingly, in Katz and Shapiro there is an inter-firm spillover, but the disclosure lag is negligible: their framework is a limiting case of our one. Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) assume that the firm takes time to successfully exploit the new technology after its introduction, which involves some development or adaptation effort. In Weeds (2002) the investment guarantees a (constant) probability of innovation.
6 See Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2008) . 7 When firms are ex ante identical, the FMA will be dissipated in equilibrium, as demonstrated in many contributions following Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) .
innovate observed in many high-tech sectors, and some examples of successful pioneers (e.g., Intel).
Second, our equilibrium implies that firms under-invest in major innovations, which therefore require substantial public intervention in favor of the R&D activity. In many previous contributions such as Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) , Riordan (1992), and Weed s (2002) , the private benefits of a major innovation and the fear of being preempted trigger a socially premature investment, calling for public incentives to limit R&D activity. In particular, Riordan (1992) focuses on the impact of price and entry regulations on the timing of adoption in the preemption equilibrium. Because regulatory schemes tend to reduce the innovator's rents, they are likely to delay the early adoption, an outcome which can be socially beneficial in his model. Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) analyze the role of experience by assuming that the probability of successful innovation is an increasing function of the time since investment. They show that collusive adoption (when pioneer and follower release innovations at the same time) may yield greater welfare than the competitive market equilibrium. This happens when the pace of technical progress is fairly high, so that leaders and followers alike desire to take full advantage of reduced innovation costs. In contrast, the competitive equilibrium, granting a strategic advantage to the pioneer, induces premature adoption. Wee ds (2002) presents a patent race version of the Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) model, in which profits evolve stochastically. She suggests that the preemption (simultaneous) equilibrium over-(under-)invests; however, the simultaneous investment equilibrium is closer to the social optimum.
8 When we focus on minor innovations-the case in which, according to the literature, the market equilibrium underinvests-our equilibrium implies that policies aimed at stimulating R&D are less sizeable than previously suggested despite the presence of inter-firm spillovers.
8 Our under-investing equilibrium in the presence of a major innovation contrasts with previous contributions inspired by Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980) . These authors assumed that a new technique suddenly becomes available to all firms, immediately triggering industry-wide investment in R&D. The competitive pressure induced by the market structure pushes the equilibrium level of R&D investment higher than the social optimum. This result can be partially ascribed to the tournament structure employed in their models. In a non tournament model, Beath et al. (1989) underscored the role of the competitive threat as a major determinant of R&D expenditure: the larger the threat, the more resources firms invest in R&D, so overinvestment and larger innovations are more likely. Delbono and Denicolò (1991) , again in a non tournament framework, find that the equilibrium R&D effort can be lower than the social optimum if the marginal efficiency of R&D expenditure is low (hence each firm invests less and obtains a smaller R&D output).
In our equilibrium, the follower invests upon benefiting from the spillover, and hence the time delay between the two R&D investments is short, which is realistic. In contrast, the existing models suggest that firms' entries either are separated by long time span, 9 or are simultaneous. The existing literature, which started with Reinganum (1981) and is excellently surveyed by Hoppe (2002) , identifies two factors characterizing the preemption and simultaneous equilibria: the length of the follower's strategic delay and the intensity of competitive pressure. In the preemption equilibrium the leader invests soon, and the second-mover delays his investment for a relatively long period. In fact, once the pioneer has sunk the investment, the follower finds it optimal to wait until the cost of R&D decreases enough to make competition worthwhile. This optimal delay allows for a long period of competitive advantage for the pioneer, implying the possibility of a large payoff for the first-mover at the expense of the follower. Competition then implies that the pioneer, to avoid being preempted, tends to anticipate her investment. Actually, in equilibrium, the first-mover invests as soon as her payoff matches the follower's, which eliminates his preemption incentive. Such an early investment turns out to be excessive from a welfarist perspective. Notice how the possibility of preemption-implying rent equalization-dissipates the FMA. Fudenb erg and Tirole demonstrate that the preemption equilibrium is subgame perfect when the size of the innovation is large. In this case, in fact, the per-period pioneer profits are considerable, which triggers the preemptive behavior. In contrast, a simultaneous equilibrium arises only after technical progress has substantially reduced innovation costs, so that the competitor can immediately follow the pioneer. In this situation, an innovator anticipates that there will be no leadership period, so it waits until releasing the new product will maximize the joint discounted stream of net profits. The collusive flavor 9 In a process innovation version of the Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) model based on Cournot competition, the follower's entry delays are typically longer than 15 years. This is so even when exogenous technical progress is fast (7% a year), speeding up the follower's reaction. In the process innovation Cournot competition version of Hoppe (2000) , when the probability of a bad technology is on the order of 5-10%, the entry lags are not much shorter. This is because the incentive to be first is still sufficiently strong to unleash preemption. As the probability that the technology performs poorly increases, the incentive to be first disappears, and the pioneer delays her innovation. In case the technology performs well, the rival firm immediately follows, and we arrive at a second-mover advantage equilibrium. Grenadier (1996) applies a stochastic version of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) model to the construction sector, arriving at median investment lags ranging from four to eight years as the standard deviation of demand ranges from 0.05% to 0.125%. While these values are adequate for construction, they seem excessive for the manufacturing sector. of this equilibrium is immediately apparent. Fudenb erg and Tirole suggest that the simultaneous market equilibrium under-invests.
In our spillover equilibrium, both firms decide to innovate at dates positioned between the preemption and simultaneous equilibria. The pioneer knows that the second-mover will attempt to exploit technical spillovers as soon as the relevant information is obtained-i.e., exactly at the end of the disclosure lag. The pioneer's period of competitive advantage is therefore shorter in the spillover equilibrium than in the preemptive one, which may lead to an SMA. When there is an FMA (due to fast technical progress, a relatively long disclosure lag, or a relatively modest spillover), the competitive pressure is weaker than in the preemption equilibrium, due to a lower difference in the leader's and follower's discounted profits. Accordingly, in the spillover equilibrium the pioneer is not forced to invest "very soon". However, the competitive pressure is still high enough to prevent a simultaneous equilibrium.
By applying the subgame perfection criterion, we find that the spillover equilibrium is particularly relevant. Indeed, it is the prevailing equilibrium for a wide range of parameters. We underscore that the spillover equilibrium is subgame perfect for reasonable values of the disclosure lag, generating a realistic entry dynamics. Notice, moreover, that in our framework, R&D diffusion and rent equalization do not imply that the R&D investment is excessive from a social planner's perspective, even though these are natural indicators of a highly competitive environment.
The paper proceeds in the standard way. In Section 2 we present our model. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the follower's and the leader's decisions, respectively. In Section 5, we discuss the equilibrium concept and compute various market equilibria in which firms compete in both the innovation and the product stages. The criterion of subgame perfection is invoked to select among market equilibria. In Section 6, we spell out the welfare implications of our analysis and concluding comments are offered in Section 7.
The model
We consider an industry composed of two firms, i and j, involved in a twostage interaction: first they decide whether or not to invest in R&D, then they compete in the final market. The R&D investment yields immediately a process innovation. The interaction between the firms is repeated over a series of (infinitesimally short) time periods. At the beginning, the two firms are symmetric, each enjoying a profit flow of π 0 . The subscript indicates the number of firms that have already introduced the innovation. A technical improvement becomes feasible at a date that is set to zero for convenience.
From that instant onward, if one firm innovates while the other postpones the R&D investment, the former becomes the leader and obtains a flow profit equal to π L 1 . The latter becomes the follower and obtains an instantaneous profit equal to π F 1 . If both firms innovate, they obtain profits of π 2 . As is standard, we assume the following:
We also introduce:
which ensures that there is an advantage to adopting first.
10 Assumption 2 is not crucial to our results; it is trivial to adapt the analysis that follows to the case in which it does not hold.
Time is continuous and the firms' horizon is infinite. Firms discount future profits at the common rate r, and in every instant they observe whether their opponent has introduced the new technology. In our setup, only one project is available, and it has a fixed size, as assumed by Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) , Hoppe (2000) , and many other authors. If a firm undertakes the project as soon as the innovation becomes technically feasible-i.e., at time 0-it pays the amount γ. The cost decreases at a constant rate ρ>0, thanks to the advances in basic research and the availability of new results obtained in related areas. Of course, this form of technical progress is exogenous. The R&D cost function is
where t L is the time when the leader introduces the technical improvement. As already mentioned, in our model technology development is instantaneous. An important stream of literature underscores that the development of a new technology is instead time consuming; in many papers, such as Toxvaerd (2007) , Ruiz-Aliseda and Zemsky (2008) and Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2008) , there are decreasing returns to per-period expenditure, so that the overall cost needed to develop a new technology is higher the shorter is the time spent for the development. We can incorporate into our framework the process of technology development under plausible assumptions. In particular, this extension requires that the productivity of the inputs used for technology development increases-and therefore the cost of the firms' investment decreases-up to the time at which they start developing. This induces the firm to choose for every innovation (and adoption) time t L , an optimal length of the development phase; γcan then be obtained as the result of a dynamic optimization process in which the per-period costs born by the innovator during the development phase depend upon several variables, including the complexity of the technology.
The follower's innovation cost has to be modeled, taking into account both the presence of the disclosure lag, and the impact of the knowledge spillover. Accordingly, we introduce in the follower's R&D cost function the exogenously determined disclosure lag ∆. An obvious but important consequence of our assumption is that the leader benefits from a competitive advantage period equal to (at least) ∆years.
11 We also consider the spillover as representing a fraction of the follower's innovation cost. Thus, the follower's R&D cost is described by
where t F is the adoption time of the follower. 12 The parameter θ∈(0,θ] represents inter-firm spillover; when θ>0, the innovation is partially appropriable: the second comer enjoys a reduction in the R&D cost by imitating his competitor at t F ≥t L +∆.θis assumed to be lower than unity. In fact, if θwere unity, the follower-bearing no innovation cost-would always invest at the end of the disclosure lag. Moreover, to make the discussion more interesting, we assume that the maximum spillover is high. Indeed, ifθwere close to zero, the results delivered by our model would be similar to those obtained in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) . In particular, the following assumption guarantees that the spillover equilibrium exists for some θand ∆.
A recent paper by Deng (2008) focuses on one of the industries in which spillovers are at their highest level-the U.S. semiconductor industry. He finds that the magnitude of the knowledge spillover is about one half of the observed R&D costs. Sensible values for the profit levels, such as the ones we shall use in Section 5.2, imply that Assumption 3 easily encompasses the empirically relevant spillover values.
11 Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) adopt the same assumption in their R&D model, which is based on that of Lee and Wilde (1980) . 12 It can be shown that Eq. (2) can be obtained from a full-fledged process of technology development when, as in Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2008) , the interim results obtained by the leader do not generate spillovers.
Before discussing the value functions' and the equilibrium concept, we introduce some technical assumptions regarding the admissible values of ∆ and γ.
The purpose of Assumption 4 is to limit the number of cases that we need to consider. While Assumption 1 guarantees that¯∆> 0 in Section 5.2, we shall verify that Assumption 4 imposes an upper bound on ∆that is higher than the empirically sensible values for the leader cost-advantage period.
According to this hypothesis, when the innovation becomes feasible (i.e., at time 0), the lump-sum cost it bears is so high that the second comer innovates after the completion of the disclosure lag, even when the pioneer invests immediately. This ensures that spillover and disclosure lag play a role in our model. Notice thatγ>0, by Assumption 1.
This way of introducing spillover and disclosure lag into the model is extremely simple. It would have been preferable to consider an environment in which they depend-possibly stochastically-upon the follower's imitation effort. In fact, our model deals with process innovation, so that reverse engineering is unfeasible, and the spillover is mainly due to information leakages. Being linked with managerial and technical personnel's mobility, with the diffusion of information through sector trade fairs, scientific papers, sector-specific magazines, and so on, the spillover can be actively increased by the follower's efforts. 13 However, the behavior of the first comer also matters in this respect. In fact, the innovators actively try to prevent the information leakages-e.g., by adopting measures increasing their personnel's loyalty, imposing long and expensive non-disclosure clauses in the labor contracts, and so on. Accordingly, a full-fledged theoretical setting would require making endogenous both the second comer's investments to shorten the disclosure lag and to increase the spillover, and the first innovator's efforts to contrast her competitor's actions.
However, even the simplest modelizations of these effects preclude the attainment of explicit results. Hence, we preferred not to pursue these developments of the model, because our framework is already fairly complex.
Moreover, if we limit our attention to the follower's imitation efforts, we obtain that they are more intense when the innovation cost is large, which implies that the spillover size is higher in the early stages of the game. A higher spillover-reducing the innovation costs-induces the follower to anticipate his entry date, which shortens the lead time for the leader.
14 Accordingly, she is discouraged from investing in the early stages. Hence, the attainment of higher spillovers in the early phases of the game undermines the possibility to attain a preemptive equilibrium and acts in favor of the spillover equilibrium.
We denote by V L (t L , t F ) the stream of future profits, discounted back to time 0, obtained by the firm investing at time t L , while her rival sinks the innovation cost at t F ≥t L . Hence, we have
The second addendum on the right-hand side represents the first-mover's stand-alone incentive, while the third is the profit reduction imposed by the follower's decision to adopt. The second-mover's payoff is
The follower's incentive to innovate is summarized by the third addendum, while the profit externality imposed by the leader on the follower is captured by the second one.
Finally, we discuss the equilibrium concept in our non-cooperative R&D game.
Notice that at any point in time each firm decides whether to invest in R&D, if it has not invested yet, knowing whether the other firms have invested or not. Accordingly, a firm's pure strategy is a map from any investment date t to the action set {Invest in R&D, Do not invest in R&D}, conditioned upon whether the other firm has previously invested (and obtained the innovation), and-in case it invested-upon whether the disclosure lag has elapsed. Subgame perfection is the natural criterion to apply in our non cooperative dynamic game. Accordingly, each firm equilibrium strategy must be a best response to the other firm's strategy, for every subgame starting at t∈(0,∞).
In our setup, only one research project is available to the firms, and the choice to innovate is an irreversible stopping decision. Our model therefore belongs to the class of symmetric timing games, which can be divided into two sub-classes according to the presence of an FMA or an SMA. As in most of the literature, we wish to restrict our attention to pure strategies. Hence, we introduce certain assumptions that allow us to disregard mixed strategies.
To deal with FMA games, we follow Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005) by assuming the following.
Assumption 6: If at some time t the two firms are indifferent between the roles of first-mover and second-mover, then to firm h, (h∈{ i, j}) is randomly assigned-with probability 1/2-the task to move first. The other firm may then choose to immediately follow the leader or postpone adopting the innovation.
15 If the leader is indifferent between adopting at time t or later, then it chooses t.
Assumption 6 is commonly used in the literature to rule out the possibility of coordination failure as an equilibrium outcome. In other words, firms do not choose to move at the same instant if they know that they will regret this choice afterwards.
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In dealing with SMA games, we assume that the equilibrium is driven by expectations and make the following assumption:
Assumption 7: When the innovation leader maximum payoff is lower than the corresponding second-mover's value, firm h, h∈{ i, j}-randomly selected with probability 1/2-believes that the other never enters first, and becomes the leader.
The above hypothesis (and therefore the equilibrium it implies) may seem arbitrary. In fact, it rules out mixed strategies equilibria, which in this context are often referred to as wars of attrition (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) . Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) argued that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is most reasonable. In our case, Pareto ranking implies that all firms prefer the pure strategy equilibrium involving an advantage for the follower. In what follows, it will become clear that Assumption 7 is not crucial either for the subgame perfectness of the spillover equilibrium or for its welfare implications.
3 The follower's investment problem
Since the follower reacts optimally to the leader's decisions, it is natural to analyze his behavior first.
After the leader has invested in the early stages of the game, the follower prefers to delay adoption for ∆years or more. In delaying longer than ∆, the follower reaps benefits not only from the spillover but also from ongoing progress in pure research. When the R&D cost function is given by (2), maximizing (4) with respect to t F we obtain the follower's optimal investment time:
This solution applies when the leader sinks the R&D cost at t L ≤ T * F −∆.
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The comparative statics on T * F gives sensible results. In particular, the higher the inter-firm spillover, the sooner the second-mover will invest. A higher value of π 2 −π F 1 increases the incentive to innovate and hence advances his decision. An increase in γor r delays his investment decision, because the innovation is more costly or future profits are more heavily discounted. The role of technical progress (ρ) is ambiguous: on the one hand, a higher value of this parameter implies that the innovation cost is lower at any given date t F , calling for earlier investment; on the other hand, rapid reduction in innovation costs may induce the follower to wait longer because he knows that the cost will quickly become even smaller. The first (direct) effect prevails over the second (indirect) effect, unless θis high.
The above solution need not be optimal if the leader invested at a time later than T * F −∆-i.e., when t L > T * F −∆. In this case, the fixed cost at T * F can be unacceptably high because the disclosure lag has not yet elapsed. The second comer will choose either to wait exactly ∆periods before investing (just long enough to grasp the inter-firm spillover), to wait fewer than ∆periods, or to follow immediately. We now analyze the above behaviors, focusing on the case of significant spillovers. We make this concept precise by defining
, 18 Assumption 5 guarantees that T * and assuming that θ≥θ (∆).
19 Notice that θ (0) = 0, and that, for ∆<¯∆, ∂θ (∆)/∂∆> 0. Figure 1 is helpful for locating the portion of space we are considering.
Suppose then that θ≥θ (∆)-i.e., that the spillover is significant. In this case, the choice of waiting less than ∆is never optimal. When the spillover is sizable, and the innovation cost is still high, waiting ∆years implies an R&D cost saving that is large enough to compensate for the efficiency disadvantage during the disclosure lag. Hence, the follower invests at the end of the disclosure lag-i.e., at t L +∆. Instead, when the R&D cost is low, because the innovation leader has decided to invest "late", it is optimal for the second firm to enter immediately without exploiting the inter-firm spillover. We define¯T as the first date on which the payoff of the "waiting ∆years 19 From the empirical perspective, the assessment of the actual size of the spillover is extremely difficult. However, according to Cohen et al. (2000) the U.S. manufacturing firms believe that the most important reason to protect a process innovation is to prevent copying. Hence, the magnitude of knowledge spillovers is perceived as relevant.
before following" choice matches that obtained by "immediately following".
, in which the follower's value function is given by (4), we immediately obtain
Notice that an increase in the spillover parameter raises¯T. That is, the follower is encouraged to postpone innovation when the benefit of imitation is high.
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The above arguments are formally presented in:
, the follower's best response to the leader's investment is to sink the R&D cost at time
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. Figure 2 summarizes the results proved in the above Proposition. The follower's behavior described in Proposition 1 determines his value function, which is exemplified by the continuous line in Figure 3 . Notice that, over the interval [0, T *
Apart from the role of θjust described, the effects of various parameters on¯T are quite similar to those on T * F . 21 Refer to the proof for Proposition 1, part (a). 22 To show this result, let the R&D cost function in (4) be given by (2) and exploit (5). Note that it is not possible to prove analytically that As for the interval t L ∈(¯T,∞), consider that the follower's best response to the leader's investment is to immediately follow her decision. Hence, the two firms are symmetric, since they invest at the same instant. Accordingly, the payoff for both firms is:
where S stands for "symmetric". Standard techniques show that V S (t S ) is increasing in t L ∈(¯T,∞) for t S < T se , where se stands for "simultaneous equilibrium", and
If¯T is small, which happens when θis modest,
> T, and V S (t S ) displays an inverted-U shape. In this case, when t S is close tō T, the positive effect of decreasing R&D cost prevails over the negative impact on V S (t S ) due to the delay of higher post-innovation profits. When¯T is high, which is the case if θis large, the latter effect already prevails at¯T, and the value function is decreasing. In Fig. 3 we have depicted the case in which V S (t S ) takes its standard inverted-U shape.
The analysis for the case of a low spillover (θ<θ (∆)) is developed in Femminis and Martini (2009) . There, it is shown that low spillover levels make our results similar to the ones obtained by Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) . This comes as no surprise: in the limiting case θ= 0, in which there are no spillovers, the disclosure lag has no effects on the follower's optimal decision, and we come again exactly to the case analyzed in that paper.
The leader's value function
We now characterize the value of a firm that invests as the leader, given that the follower will act optimally in the future.
Notice that once the leader has invested, her value is the discounted stream of her future profits. This payoff is negatively affected by the follower's decision to invest. Proposition 1 guarantees that the behavior of the follower is different in the three intervals [0, T * F −∆], (T * F −∆,¯T], and (¯T,∞). The follower's behavior influences the leader's payoff, because it affects the length of her cost advantage period; therefore, the leader's maximum value function has different behaviors in these three time intervals.
To appreciate the value function behavior for t L ∈[0, T * F −∆], consider first a model without spillover. In this case, if the leader opts for an early adoption, she is aware that her competitor will postpone his investment for a long time. This situation generates a payoff function whose inverted-U shape is determined by two opposing forces. An increase in the leader's adoption time induces a reduction in her innovation cost, which increases her value, but it also implies a shortening in her efficiency advantage period, which reduces her discounted profits. When t L is relatively low, the former effect dominates the latter because the cost reduction induced by the technological externality is quantitatively relevant. In other words, the leader's optimal entry date is obtained by balancing the later attainment of the stand-alone incentive, with the decrease in the innovation cost. Hence, the leader's optimal investment date is independent from the follower's decision, and therefore it is the same for any spillover. Maximizing (3) with respect to t L , one immediately obtains
While Assumption 1 guarantees that T * L < T * F when θ= 0, the joint effect of ∆and θ(which reduces T * F ) may imply that T * L > T * F −∆, in which case the leader's value function is increasing in [0, T * F −∆]. The effect of θon T * F has already been highlighted when we discussed Eq. (5); notice moreover that a longer ∆reduces the time interval during which the leader knows that T * F represents the follower's optimal response. 23 Simple calculations show that T * L is larger than T * F −∆for values of θ>θ (∆), where
In Fig. 1 , θ (∆) is the downward-sloping, bold curve, portrayed only for values such that θ (∆) >θ (∆).
24 Notice also that by substituting (5) into payoff functions (3) and (4), we obtain that θ≥θ (∆) implies that
. In fact, θreduces T * F , and hence the spillover 23 This happens because T * F is computed assuming that the follower exploits the spillover, and hence waits for the completion of the disclosure lag. 24 While it is obvious that ∂θ (∆)/∂∆< 0, the condition θ (0) > 0 only holds when Assumption 2 is satisfied. It is trivial to adapt the analysis that follows to the case in which this Assumption does not hold. shortens the leader's cost-advantage period, reducing her value function.
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Accordingly, when θ>max{θ (∆),θ (∆)} (in Regions A and B in Fig. 1) , the innovation leader's value function is increasing in the interval [0, T *
, the leader's value function is drawn as the dashed line in Fig. 3 . In the small area θ∈[θ (∆),θ (∆)) (Region C in Fig. 1 ), the spillovers are sufficiently high to allow
, but, on the other hand, these spillovers are also low enough that V L (t L , T * F ) takes its standard inverted U shape (in fact, T * L < T * F −∆since θ<θ (∆)). In this case, the leader's value function for t L ∈[0, T * F −∆] is depicted as in Fig. 4 . When t L ∈(T * F −∆,¯T], the leader's payoff function tends to assume an inverted U shape. 26 This behavior can be easily understood when we recall that, for θ≥θ (∆), the leader is aware that the follower will grant her a constant efficiency period equal to the disclosure lag (refer to Proposition 1). Therefore, when t L is close to T * F −∆, and hence the R&D cost is still relatively high, the reduction in this cost due to the technological externality outweighs the effects of postponing high post-innovation profits (in current value, the 25 Exploiting equations (3) and (5), it is easy to show that
latter do not change over time). As t L increases, and the R&D cost is reduced, the disadvantages of postponing innovation exceed the benefits.
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Now consider a "late" leader's innovation, that is an innovation taking place in the time interval (¯T,∞). In this case, the R&D cost is so low that it is optimal for the second firm to renounce the spillover benefit and immediately imitate his rival's investment (refer to Proposition 1, Part (c)). Naturally, the first firm is well aware of this fact and makes her decision anticipating such behavior. This leads to an equilibrium in which the two firms maximize their joint payoff. In this context, the two firms are symmetric, so maximizing a single firm's payoff yields the joint maximum as well. Accordingly, the payoff for the first firm is V S (t S ), given by (7), which is increasing for t S < T se , given by (8).
The market equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the equilibrium of the non cooperative R&D game. As already underscored, subgame perfection requires that the equilibrium must survive all the possible off-equilibrium deviations. Because the value functions are highly non linear, the SPNE cannot always be determined analytically. However, when the spillover is significant, we prove that preemption in the early interval [0, T * F −∆] cannot be part of the SPNE. Moreover, we characterize the portions of the parameter space in which the spillover equilibrium is the unique SPNE, and then-provided that the SPNE is of the spillover type-we characterize the portions of the parameters space in which it belongs to the class of games with FMA or with SMA. Finally, we determine numerically the unique pure strategy SPNE as a function of the parameters for all of the relevant spillover levels.
A n a l y t i c a l results
When the spillover is significant (i.e., when θ∈(max{θ (∆),θ (∆)},θ]), the unique SPNE either prescribes that the leader enters in the intermediate interval (T * F −∆,¯T] (and hence we have a spillover equilibrium) or she enters late (and hence we have a simultaneous entry). 27 When θgets smaller,¯T is reduced (as implied by Eq. (6)). Hence, the negative effect may not have time to become strong enough to induce an inverted U behavior in the leader's value function.
28 As will become clear in the next section, Fig.  4 represents the case θ∈ [θ (∆), min{θ (∆),θ (∆)}) (refer to Fig. 1 ). When θ∈[θ (∆),θ (∆)), we have an SMA game.
DefineˆT L as the first-mover entry date maximizing the leader's payoff in the interval (T * F −∆,¯T], given the follower's optimal reply (i.e.,
. We now prove:
Lemma 2 When θ∈[max{θ (∆),θ (∆)},θ], the unique SPNE, predicts that the leader enters:
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
The Lemma implies that, when the spillover is sufficiently high, the leader's equilibrium entry cannot be in [0, T * F −∆]. This result is to be ascribed to the influence of the spillover on the follower's optimal entry date T * F : from Eq. (5) it is immediate that the stronger the spillover, the earlier T * F takes place, which reduces the leader's competitive advantage period. When θ≥ max{θ (∆),θ (∆)}, the leader's payoff in the interval [0, T * F −∆] is undermined seriously enough that she always prefers to enter in (T * F −∆,∞). When the SPNE is in (¯T,∞), it is unique due to the concavity of the payoff function V S (T se ). When the SPNE is in (T * F −∆,¯T], its uniqueness is guaranteed by the concavity of V L (t L , t L +∆) and by the fact that the leader's and the follower's value functions intersect once, at the leader's investment date
comes from the presence of the spillover. In the intermediate interval, by delaying entry for ∆periods, the follower obtains a large reduction in fixed costs, increasing his value. Accordingly, the follower may enjoy a payoff larger than that of the first-mover. This actually happens only in the initial part of the interval (T * F −∆,¯T], when the R&D cost is large. In fact, the presence of the spillover parameter also involves a second effect. Because the spillover makes the benefit of postponing imitation larger (and the follower will have no desire to renounce the benefit),¯T is large as well. Thus, by entering the market in the late part of (T * F −∆,¯T], the leader grasps higher payoffs because the R&D cost is low.
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29 To verify that V L (¯T,¯T +∆ ) > V F (¯T,¯T +∆ ) , substitute Eq. (6) into the payoffs' definitions (3)-(4), and exploit Assumption 1. 30 When the spillover is low (θ<θ (∆)), the benefit of waiting to the end of the disclosure ¯T] , and no pure strategy equilibrium exists. The results in Femminis and Martini (2009) imply that the mixed-strategy equilibrium that exists in (T The results in Lemma 2 can be illustrated intuitively by means of Fig.  3 . Consider first Panel (a). For the parameters configuration considered,
, which rules out the simultaneous equilibrium.
, preemption (and Assumption 6) imply that the SPNE entry dates are {T ip , T ip +∆ }. In fact, the roles of innovation leader and follower are not pre-assigned. If one firm believes that the other will adopt at timeˆT L , it is in his interest to preempt at timeˆT L −dt. By backward induction, we conclude that the only equilibrium strategy is to invest as soon as the leader's payoff is equal to the follower's (i.e., at T ip ). Assumption 6 grants each firm a 50% chance of being the first innovator, and ensures that only one firm invests at T ip . Notice that this FMA-type equilibrium involves rent dissipation. Notice also that the behavior of the payoff functions implies that no firm can gain by preempting before T ip . Panel (b) provides an example of an SMA game. Investing simultaneously at T se , both firms would obtain
, and hence, by Assumption 7, the firm believing that the other one never enters first chooses t L =ˆT L . Because the other firm has no incentive to preempt its rival before dateˆT L , the equilibrium is {ˆT L ,ˆT L +∆}.
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The results in Lemma 2 apply for large portions of the parameter space, namely for Regions A and B in Fig. 1 .
In case of a relevant spillover, it is also possible to prove:
Proposition 3 When θ∈[max{θ (∆),θ (∆)},θ], there exists a unique value for θ, defined asθ(∆) ≥max{θ (∆),θ (∆)}, such that for θ≥θ(∆) the SPNE predicts that the leader enters in (T * F −∆,¯T].
The intuition for this result is simple. For the follower, a strategy prescribing him to forsake the spillover becomes less appealing as the spillover itself becomes larger. Hence, the time interval in which the SPNE involves a simultaneous entry is postponed (¯T increases with θ; refer to Eq. 6). Hence, 31 Had V S (T se ) been a global maximum, the SPNE would have predicted a simultaneous entry at T se , as prescribed by Lemma 2, part (a). 32 If we rejected Assumption 7, we would let our firms to start to randomize their entry decisions atˆT L . At every instant of time, the firms would then obtain an expected payoffs lower than the leader's one, due to the possibility of getting a low value in case of a simultaneous entry. Accordingly, Pareto ranking implies that all firms prefer the pure strategy equilibrium involving an advantage for the follower. the present value of an R&D investment in the intermediate interval (T * F −∆,¯T] exceeds that of a much-delayed simultaneous entry.
We now consider a case in which the spillover is weak-i.e., θ∈(θ (∆), θ (∆)]. In this case, we are in Region C of Fig. 1 , and the spillover is sufficiently low as to allow for an equilibrium in [0, T * F −∆], when the advantage for the leader is still high. Nonetheless, θis large enough to induce a higher payoff for the follower for some t L ∈(T * F −∆,¯T], which implies the possibility of an equilibrium also in the intermediate interval (refer to Fig. 4) . As before, the simultaneous investment date T se (Eq. 8) is a candidate equilibrium: in fact, provided that time has elapsed with no investment until¯T, for each firm it is optimal to invest at T se if the other does the same. This result is formally proved in:
Lemma 4 When θ∈(θ (∆),θ (∆)], the unique SPNE, predicts that the leader enters:
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. 
. Accordingly, preemption implies that the candidate equilibrium dates in
Accordingly, the strategy prescribing investment at t L ≥T * L if no previous entry has taken place, and investment at T * F if a previous investment has occurred, is a profitable deviation from the candidate equilibrium strategies {t L =ˆT ip , t F =ˆT ip +∆}. The standard preemption argument, and Assumption 6, ensure that one firm invests at T¯L, while the other invests at T * F . As usual, the preemption argument yields equal payoffs to the two symmetric firms in the SPNE.
We now discuss in more detail the possibility that the equilibrium involves a second-mover advantage.
Consider that an increase in the spillover, benefiting the follower, reduces his incentive to preempt the leader. In panel (a) of Fig. 3 , an increase in θamounts to an upward shift in V F (t L , t L +∆), which postpones T ip . As θincreases, T ip becomes large enough to exceedˆT L , which is the date where V L (t L , t L +∆) is maximum. When this is the case, we have that
This case is portrayed in Panel (b) of Fig.  3 , and leads to SMA games whenever
as the spillover value for which T ip =ˆT L . The dashed line in Fig. 1 represents θ (∆). 33 We are now ready to prove the following important result:
Proposition 5 If the SPNE is such that the leader's entry date is in the subinterval (T *
F −∆,¯T], it belongs to: (a) the FMA class when θ∈(max{θ (∆),θ (∆)}, min{θ (∆),θ}]; (b) the SMA class when θ∈(max{θ (∆),θ (∆)},θ].
As intuition suggests, the candidate equilibrium can shift from a firstmover advantage to a second-mover advantage if θincreases for a given disclosure lag. The higher the spillover, the lower the fixed costs for the follower, and the more probable an SMA.
Numerical results
The SPNE cannot be determined analytically as a function of the parameters, due to the high degree of nonlinearity in our model. Hence, we now present some numerical results for the Cournot competition framework with linear demand detailed in Appendix B.
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In our simulations, we normalize the market dimension parameter A to unity and fix the discount rate r to 0.03. The latter is consistent with our time 33 It is possible to show that θ (0) = 0, that when Assumption 2 is satisfied, ∂θ (∆)/∂∆ ∆=0 > 0, and that θ (∆) ≥θ (∆) for ∆∈ [0,∆] . 34 Our routine has been written in Matlab, and it is based on a discretization of the space [θx∆] for θ∈[10 (−10) , 0.8] and ∆∈[10 (−10) , 3]. We have used 300,000 gridpoints, but our results do not change significantly for any number of points larger than 20,000. The Matlab routine is available upon request from the authors. unit, which is set to one year. The parameter γdoes not play a substantial role, provided that γ≥γ; the effect of higher γ(i.e., less efficient R&D) is to postpone all equilibria without changing their relative convenience. Hence, we choose γ= 50 with no loss of generality. As for ρ, we refer to the prior literature on industry-specific innovation costs. We consider Cummins and Violante's (2002) estimation of the rate of technical change in several sectorspecific capital goods as an approximation of the reduction in investment costs. While this is a valid proxy in the case of development of an already-existing technology, it may provide a prima facie estimate also when the R&D component of the firms' investment is sizeable. Unsurprisingly, the sector for which the productivity of capital goods has grown at the fastest pace (more than 20% per year in the U.S. over the entire post-WWII period) is "computers and office equipment". Apart from this outlier, the greatest rates of technical change occurred in communications equipment (9% per year), aircraft (8%), and instruments (6%). We then have a 5% annual change in the production costs of "service industry machinery". Productivity growth rates in all other sectors range between 0.1% and 3.8% per year. Because a non-negligible share of the productivity increase is retained by the producer, we simulate the model for: ρ∈{ 0.01; 0.04; 0.07}. The first value of ρcharacterizes technologically mature sectors, which benefit from minor technical progress in the industries producing the machinery they require. We label this scenario Industry I. We set ρ= 0.04 to represent a fairly dynamic sector (Industry II), and the case of ρ= 0.07, denoted Industry III, is a frontier sector.
As detailed in Appendix B, to preserve the duopolistic structure of our market we consider only non-drastic innovations. Hence, the size of the R&D output, x, must be lower than A (x < 1). We investigate two types of output: a minor innovation where x = 0.05A(= 0.05), and a major innovation where x = 0.5A(= 0.5).
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To see that¯∆increases with x, take the definition of¯∆given in Assumption 4 and then substitute into it the values for π L 1 ,π F 1 , and π 2 obtained in Appendix B. Computing lim x→0¯∆ for ρ∈{0.01; 0.04; 0.07}, we obtain {23.105, 7.438, 4.451}. Hence, the restriction implied by Assumption 4 is realistic in most contexts. Figure 5 portrays the equilibria arising in case of a minor innovation; the light grey areas being those such that θ≤θ (∆). In panel (a), we see that a low spillover implies a simultaneous equilibrium in Industry I. As θincreases, however, the spillover equilibrium prevails. For instance, when ∆=2.5, the simultaneous equilibrium prevails for 0.046(≡θ (2.5)) ≤θ≤0.058, and the spillover equilibrium prevails for θ>0.058.
An intuitive explanation of this result is as follows. As underscored by Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) , the smaller the cost reduction, the weaker the incentive to innovate first. 36 Hence, a small value for x means that even the highest deviation payoff for the first-mover is low, so that the preemptive equilibrium never prevails over the simultaneous investment one. Moreover, a low spillover gives rise to a simultaneous equilibrium because it shrinks the intermediate region, so that the second firm has little incentive to wait ∆years (refer to the definition for¯T). Hence, the simultaneous equilibrium prevails over any possible deviation occurring in the intermediate period. As θincreases, the intermediate region expands, leading to a situation in which the first-mover's deviation payoff becomes greater than her simultaneous equilibrium payoff. This leads to dominance of the spillover equilibrium.
Panel (b) in Fig. 5 shows the equilibria arising in Industry II. To appreciate this figure, notice that, in the intermediate interval, an increase in ρbenefits the leader more than the follower: because the leader bears the full R&D cost, she makes the most of its steeper decrease. The increase in ρup to 0.04 is sufficient to let the spillover equilibrium always be subgame perfect in the area under scrutiny. , is more convex in x than the second-mover's profit function, π 2 (see Appendix B). 37 Notice also that, ceteris paribus, as ρincreases, an higher threshold θ (∆) is needed to guarantee that V L (T *
. This (modest) shrinking of the area under scrutiny acts in favour of the subgame perfectness of the spillover equilibrium. The pattern is similar to that observed for Industry II.
Having computed the portion of the parameter space in which the spillover equilibrium is subgame perfect, we can distinguish the FMA cases from the SMA cases (refer again to Fig. 5 ). Our simulations show several areas in which the spillover equilibrium is of the FMA type. This result stands in remarkable contrast to Hoppe's (2000) contribution. If one inserts the same specifications for demand and costs that we have adopted for our simulations into her framework, the resulting equilibrium implies an SMA for any strictly positive probability that the technology will perform poorly. In fact, a minor innovation induces the simultaneous equilibrium, where the pioneer delays innovation and her rival immediately follows suit (if the technology performs well). Accordingly, the second-mover obtains higher expected profits. In our model, the competitive advantage period granted to the pioneer by the disclosure lag can be sufficient for an FMA.
38 Moreover, our simulation shows that the area in which the spillover equilibrium grants an FMA increases with ρ. While faster technical progress reduces the adoption cost sunk by both firms, higher values of ρfavor the first-mover (who bears the entire cost of R&D) more than the follower. For example, when ∆=2.5 and ρ= 0.07, we have a FMA spillover equilibrium for θ∈(0.082, 0.578]; when ρ= 0.04, we have an FMA equilibrium for θ∈(0.069, 0.368], and for ρ= 0.01 we have an FMA equilibrium only for θ∈ (0.058, 0.192] . Thus only when the technical progress parameter is low we can expect an SMA equilibrium for realistic values of the disclosure lag.
The case of a major innovation (x = 0.50A = 0.50) is portrayed in Fig. 6 . Here, the simultaneous equilibrium never prevails. A high value of x greatly favors the preemptive equilibrium, as mentioned in Fudenb erg and Tirole (1985) . However, in our framework, a preemption equilibrium arises only for moderate values of the spillover parameter. The spillover equilibrium tends to prevail over the preemptive equilibrium for two reasons. First, a high value of θnegatively influences the first-mover's payoff in the early interval because it anticipates the follower's investment date (see Eq. (5)). Second, in the intermediate interval, as the spillover increases, the second-mover's payoff gets larger. This effect further reduces the leader's incentive to invest. (Refer, for example to Fig. 3, panel (a) ). Thus, a lower difference in the value functions implies a milder competition and leads to higher payoffs for both firms in the candidate spillover equilibrium, which becomes subgame perfect. The thresholds for θyielding a subgame-perfect spillover equilibrium are slightly higher for a major than for a minor innovation, due to the strong incentive to be a pioneer provided by a major innovation. Note that, with a major innovation, the areas in which the spillover equilibrium is of the FMA type are still relevant. Again, when the area where an FMA type prevails is larger, the technical progress is faster.
Our calculations show that, for low θ, the leader's payoff tends to be higher in the spillover equilibrium, than in an preemptive one with no spillover. In fact, the leader pays a lower R&D cost and benefits from the reduction in the follower preemption incentive. Accordingly, leaders may be induced to create mechanisms for generating spillovers where they are lacking. For example, the firm may choose a geographical location close to their competitors or adopt a policy allowing its researchers to take part in scientific workshops and conferences. This point is similar to the one raised by Pacheco-de-Almeyda and Zemsky (2008), who-in a model of time consuming technology development built in the spirit of Ruiz-Aliseda and Zemsky (2008)-challenge the view that inter-firm spillovers are detrimental to the leader.
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In sum, our analysis of the equilibrium selection process suggests that the spillover equilibrium is subgame perfect in large portions of the parameter space. Notice, moreover, that for both types of innovations, the portion of the parameters space in which the spillover equilibrium is of the FMA type is fairly large and increases with ρ.
We l f a r e analysis
In order to assess the welfare properties of the market equilibrium, we design and solve the benevolent planner problem, under the constraint that it can only manage a proportional subsidy on investment, financed by lump-sum taxes. In particular, we determine the parameter configurations in which the social welfare is positively affected by the investment subsidy. There, the market equilibrium implies under-investment.
40 39 In their model, the leader provides some (low) level of spillover to induce the follower to shift from a simultaneous to an imitative development strategy. Such a strategy requires that the follower starts developing his technology only once he has observed the outcome of the leader's effort. Accordingly, the leader benefits from some reduction in R&D costs, due to the slowing down of her development activity, and from the increase in her cost advantage period. In our model, instead, the lower preemption incentive is crucial in delivering the result. 40 Notice that in our second-best perspective neither the number of firms acting in the market nor the way they compete in the second-stage quantity game lies within the regulatory power of the benevolent planner. This is standard in the literature: see, e.g., Stenbacka and Tombak (1994), Hoppe (2000) , and Weeds (2002). In our setup, the first-best equilibrium for an omnipotent planner would imply the presence of only one firm: whenever there are non-decreasing returns in the innovation size or probability, it is optimal to have only one firm to innovate and cover the entire market at the marginal (post-innovation) cost.
In our application, the planner's decisions are based on the instantaneous welfare levels attained by the Cournot decentralized solution, computed in Appendix B. Because the market game often does not have a closed-form solution, to appreciate the welfare effect of a marginal subsidy, we need to rely on numerical simulations, which are based on the same parameterization we used in the previous section. Our computations allow us to obtain the following results: i) Whenever the preemption equilibrium is subgame perfect, the market solution calls for a tax on investment, and hence implies over-investment.
ii) Symmetrically, when the simultaneous equilibrium prevails, the decentralized solution involves a too-low level of investment, requiring a subsidy.
iii) When the spillover equilibrium dominates, it implies under-investment, but for a small-parameters subset, the size of which is decreasing in the size of the innovation, and increasing in the speed of the exogenous technical progress.
While the first two results are intuitive, the third deserves more attention.
To understand why an over-investing spillover equilibrium is less likely the larger is the innovation size, consider that both the instantaneous social welfare and the firms' profits increase more than proportionally with the size of the innovation (refer to Appendix B). Because the social welfare is larger than the pioneer's profit, the wedge between the social and the private incentives to innovate also increases with x, which acts against the possibility of overinvestment with a large innovation.
In the market game, a steeper cost reduction profile has strong effects on the innovation dates. In fact, an increase in ρbenefits the leader more than the follower, who bears only a share 1 −θof the cost. This provides an incentive to the second-comer's preemptive behaviors, which may lead to over-investment also in the spillover equilibrium. Hence, the portion of the parameter space with over-investment is wider the larger is ρ. However, even in the case ρ= 0.07, the over-investment area is small. The areas in black in Fig. 7 highlight the parameter combinations implying an over-investing spillover equilibrium. Hence, not only does the spillover equilibrium prevail for most of the parameter configurations (as shown in Sub-section 5.2), but it also implies that there is under-investment in R&D, with the exception of small parameter areas. 42 In particular, the under-investment result applies also when the innovation size is large. Therefore, even in the presence of major innovations, the duopolistic market equilibrium calls for public policies aimed at increasing the research activity, unless the inter-firm spillover is low, so that the incentives to hasten innovation are high enough that the preemptive equilibrium prevails. Notice that the natural indicators of a highly competitive environment, namely a diffusion equilibrium and rent equalization, do not necessarily imply that the R&D investment is excessive from the social planner's perspective.
When we focus on minor innovations-the case in which the market equilibrium underinvests, according to the earlier literature-our results imply that the policies aimed at stimulating R&D have to be less sizeable than suggested before, because the spillover equilibrium is closer to the social optimum than the simultaneous equilibrium.
Conclusions
We analyze a duopoly game of innovation characterized by exogenous technological progress. In this setting, firms take into account a technological spillover process that lowers the second-mover's innovation cost. The spillover only affects the R&D cost after some time, a period called the disclosure lag. Both features affect the firms' incentive to pioneer the innovation (i.e., become the first-mover) or imitate the new technology. We show that an equilibrium arises in which R&D investments are undertaken at dates in between the preemption-type and simultaneous-type equilibria already studied in the literature.
This spillover equilibrium is subgame perfect for a wide range of parameters, and may give rise to either a first-mover advantage (FMA) or a second-mover advantage (SMA). While the incentive to be the pioneer is inversely related to the spillover level, it is also directly influenced by the speed of technical progress and the length of the disclosure lag. In particular, we have found that an FMA persists for realistic levels of information spillover, and for disclosure lags consistent with the competitive advantage periods observed in reality. Finally, the spillover equilibrium is socially inefficient, implying a low level of investment in R&D.
These results were obtained in a framework that complements Hoppe's (2000) analysis. In her model, instantaneous informational spillovers produced an SMA over a large portion of the parameter space. We have shown that when a disclosure lag is added to the model, equilibrium results are less favorable to the second comer.
Our analysis raises some policy implications. First, R&D subsidies should be helpful for a wide range of market configurations. In our duopoly model, we rarely obtain over-investment. Under-investment happens even in the presence of major innovations, which imply a large incentive to invest in R&D. When the innovation size is small, the dominance of the spillover equilibrium calls for R&D subsidies that are less intense than suggested in the earlier literature. Policies designed without taking into account the inter-firm spillover can be oversized even when the spillover is quantitatively modest. In fact, the spillover equilibrium calls for moderate policies, which may prove easier to implement from a political perspective.
Second, research joint ventures (RJV) should be assessed in more favorable terms than those implied by the literature following d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) , and Kamien, Muller, and Zhang (1992) . While an RJVmoderating the competitive pressure to invest in R&D-may induce a toosharp reduction in investment in comparison with the preemption equilibrium, it is likely to improve social welfare over the under-investing spillover equilibrium. Notice, moreover, that the joint R&D activity may grant information flows that are faster or larger than those characterizing the decentralized solution, which acts in favor of a welfare-improving RJV.
Our setting can be extended in several directions. The leader's payoff tends to be higher in the spillover equilibrium with low spillover than in a preemption equilibrium with no spillover. In the former case, the leader pays lower R&D costs and benefits from the follower's reduced preemption incentive. Accordingly, as suggested by Pacheco-de-Almeyda and Zemsky (2008) , the leader would like to create a spillover if none is present. However, even should a firm commit to knowledge dissemination, it would have to balance the positive effects of spillover against the negative effects of a shorter disclosure lag. An analysis of this trade-off is left for future research. It would also be interesting to endogenize the spillover size and the length of the disclosure lag. Both extensions would require heavy use of numerical techniques. Moreover, the analysis of Section 5 suggests that the effects of the disclosure lag on the dominance areas are weak. Hence, our main result should not be undermined by the adoption of a richer framework. Part (a): The payoff at time 0 for the second firm, when it invests at t F , is given by (4).
Suppose that the leader has sunk the innovation cost at time t L ∈ [0, T * F −∆], and that the second-mover decides to wait at least ∆years to grasp the inter-firm spillover. In this case, according to Eq. (2), the innovation cost is C F (t F ) = (1 −θ)γe −ρt F . A few straightforward calculations then show that T * F , as given by (5)
Alternatively, the second comer could decide not to wait ∆periods. In this case, he should invest at
This course of action implies that T F ∈[t L , t L +∆). If this restriction were not satisfied, the innovation follower would have chosen to benefit from the spillover. Since T F > T * F , whenever t L ∈[0, T * F −∆] the innovation follower grasps the imitation benefits and invests at T * F . Because of this fact, the follower's payoff can be written as Fig. 3 and 4. ) Part (b): When t L > T * F −∆, the innovation follower will never wait more than ∆years, simply because t L > T * F −∆. Hence, he may (1) wait exactly ∆periods to grasp the benefit of the spillover, (2) invest immediately after the innovation leader, or (3) wait for a span shorter than ∆to exploit the cost benefits of exogenous technological progress, and then invest (renouncing the inter-firm spillover). 
. This inequality immediately boils down to
which is satisfied when t L ≤¯T. Hence, the innovation follower never chooses (2) as his best response for any t L ∈(T * F −∆,¯T]. Next, we compare (1) (1) with (3) 
. During this interval, the payoff function for a follower who does not exploit the inter-firm spillover is always increasing. In fact, this function is concave, with a global maximum at t F = T F ∀t L . Hence, it is optimal for the follower to invest with a delay no less than ∆, which implies that the spillover is actually exploited.
When t L ∈(T F −∆, T F ], the best response for the innovation follower must be determined by comparing the payoffs of delaying for ∆periods, and investing at time T F . Hence, we need to determine when
It is easy to show that the left-hand side of (A.2) is non-increasing in t L over the whole interval (T F −∆, T F ]. We then evaluate Eq. (A.2) at t L = T F , and exploit Eq. (A.1) to substitute out T F when convenient. The resulting inequality is
which is fulfilled when θ≥θ (∆) if Assumption 4 is satisfied. Hence, under this restriction, waiting ∆periods is a best response for any t L ∈(T F −∆, T F ]. Finally, (3) can never be optimal for t L ∈(T F ,¯T] simply because the payoff function for a follower who does not exploit the spillover is decreasing in t F ∈(t L ,¯T]. Thus, there is no point in waiting once the leader has already invested; moreover, recall that the immediate investment strategy has already been proven to be dominated by the one involving the delay ∆.
Part (c): The proof of part (b) implies that the innovation follower will never wait ∆periods for any t L ≥¯T. Hence, for t L ∈(¯T,∞), he may
(1) invest immediately after the innovation leader, or (2) wait for a span shorter than ∆(to exploit exogenous technological progress) and then invest, renouncing the inter-firm spillover.
The proof of part (b) implies that when the innovation follower decides to wait for a span shorter than ∆he invests at time T F for any t L ∈(T F − ∆, T F ]. In fact, the payoff function for the follower, V F (t L , t F ), has a maximum at T F . We have already noted that for θ>θ (∆),¯T≥T F . Hence, under this parameter restriction, the second innovator invests immediately after the innovation leader. It is never in the follower's interest to wait ∆periods, because t L >¯T and V F (t L , t F ) is decreasing in t F over the whole interval t L ∈[¯T,∞).
Lemma 2
We first show that if θ>max{θ (∆),θ (∆)}, the maximum of the leader's value function within the interval [0,¯T] lies in the sub-interval (T *
, the follower innovates with a delay of ∆. Accordingly, the first innovator's pay- 
Part (a):
The strategies that support the simultaneous investment equilibrium are the following: each firm chooses "Investment" in every subgame on (¯T,∞), given the occurrence of a previous investment, and "Investment" in every subgame on (T se ,∞) given no previous entry. To see whether these strategies form an equilibrium, consider the subgames starting at t≥T se , given no previous entry. When T se >¯T, it is clear that no firm can gain by preempting before T se , since V S (T se ) is the maximum on [0,∞) and because by assumption
. Also, it is not profitable to deviate from the proposed strategy, by delaying the investment decision. The first-mover will still be the leader, but she obtains lower profits; the secondmover cannot deviate from the proposed strategy by definition of¯T. A similar reasoning applies when T se =¯T.
, a profitable deviation from the simultaneous equilibrium at T se obviously exists, being the strategy prescribing to choose "Investment" on [ˆT L ,∞) given no previous entry, and
, the proposed deviation is preferred by Assumption 6.) Accordingly, the simultaneous investment at T se cannot be an equilibrium.
To show that the equilibrium with the leader investing in (T * F −∆,¯T] is unique, we preliminarily prove that there is a unique rent-equalization point in (T *
(1-4), we obtain:
and exploit the definition for¯T (Eq. (6)) inside the square bracket, to obtain:
which is positive because, by Assumption 1, π
The first addendum in the square brackets above is negative and constant, while the second is positive but decreasing in t L . Accordingly, ∂δ(t L , t L + ∆)/∂t L may change its sign only once, which is sufficient to conclude that the equation δ(t L , t L +∆) = 0 has only one zero in (T * F −∆,¯T], which is T ip .
Calculations show that
, then the preemption possibility and Assumption 6 guarantee that the equilibrium entry dates in [0,¯T] are {T ip , T ip +∆}. The strategies supporting this equilibrium are the following: both firms choose "Investment" on [T ip ,∞) given no previous entry, and "Investment" on [t L +∆,∞) given the occurrence of a previous investment. To check that these strategies form an equilibrium, con-
. Accordingly, no firm can gain by preempting before T ip . Also, it is not profitable to deviate from the proposed strategy, by delaying the investment decision. The strategy prescribing "Investment" on [t L ,∞), with t L > T ip given no previous entry, and "Investment" on [t L +∆,∞) given the occurrence of a previous investment induces a preemptive entry of the other player.
WhenˆT
, Assumption 7 and an argument similar to the one discussed above imply that the equilibrium entry dates in
Hence, the equilibrium predicts that the first-movers' entry is in (T * F − ∆,¯T], and is unique.
Proposition 3
The proof proceeds in three steps.
First, notice thatθ(∆), defined in the proof for Lemma 2, is lower than 1 − e (r+ρ)∆ 1 − (r +ρ)
Accordingly, for 1−e (r+ρ)∆ 1 − (r +ρ)
≤θ, the proof for Lemma 2 and Eq. (8),
, and T se =¯T, These facts allow us to prove that there exists a unique θ≤θ(∆), defined as θ(∆), such that for θ≥θ(∆), V L (ˆT L ,ˆT L +∆)≥V S (T se ). Notice that it may beθ(∆) <θ (∆).
Lemma 4
Notice that, because θ≤θ (∆), V L (t L , T * F ) has a local maximum in [0, T * 
F )} a profitable deviation from the simultaneous equilibrium at T se obviously exists, and accordingly investment at T se cannot be an equilibrium. From part (b) of proof for Lemma 2, we know that, whenˆT L ≥T ip , the preemption possibility and Assumption 6 guarantee that the candidate equilibrium entry dates in [0,¯T] are {T ip , T ip +∆}. In this case, if V L (T ip , T ip +∆)> V L (T * L , T * F ), an argument similar to the one discussed in part (b) of the proof for Lemma 2 implies that the equilibrium entry dates are {T ip , T ip +∆}. Part (b) of the proof for Lemma 2 implies that ifˆT L < T ip , the equilibrium entry dates in
, and adapting the argument discussed in part (b) of the proof for Lemma 2, one can show that the equilibrium entry dates are {ˆT L ,ˆT L +∆}.
Part (c):
, the strategies prescribing the entry dates {T ip , T ip +∆} cannot form an equilibrium. In fact, for both firms, a profitable deviation is provided by the strategy: "Investment" on [T * L ,∞) given no previous entry, and "Investment" on [T * F ,∞), given the occurrence of a previous investment. It is then possible to show that Assumption 6 guarantees the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in [0, T *
. This equilibrium predicts that the entry dates are {T L , T * F }, where 
Proposition 5
Notice that Assumption 3 guarantees that the area (max{θ (∆),θ (∆)},θ] is non-empty; notice, moreover, that θ (∆) ≥θ (∆) for ∆∈ [0,∆] . Lemma (2) guarantees that, for θ≥max{θ (∆),θ (∆)}, T ip , the unique solution for the equation V L (t L , t L +∆)= V F (t L , t L +∆), belongs to the interval [T * F −∆,¯T]. Then compute that T ip <ˆT L when θ<θ (∆).
Appendix B: A Cournot interpretation for payoffs and welfare levels
The two firms, i and j, composing the industry, in each (infinitesimally short) period, are involved in a two-stage interaction: first they decide whether to innovate or not, and then they compete à la Cournot. Market demand is linear and equal to: P = a−Q, where P is the market-clearing price and Q = q i +q j is the total quantity supplied. Each firm has a unit cost of production c.
Investment in R&D immediately yields a process innovation that shrinks the unit production cost by an amount x, with x < c. The post-innovation production cost of firm h is therefore C(q h ) = (c − x)q h , h = i, j.
Each firm's payoff depends not only on its own adoption date but also on its rival's. If neither firm has invested prior to period t, their individual profits in the Cournot subgame at t are those of the pre-innovation stage; i.e., If only one firm (say, firm 1) invests in R&D at time t, it benefits from the efficiency advantage and obtains a higher market share. The market price at t decreases from its pre-innovation level, and the individual profits become Because the quantity produced by the firm that has not innovated is (A − x)/3, to preserve the duopolistic structure of our market we need to assume that A > x. In a Cournot environment, this hypothesis implies that the cost-reducing innovation is non-drastic. For this asymmetric behavior at t, the welfare is: .6) with W 1 > W 0 . Finally, we need to compute the outcomes when both firms have innovated at t. In this case, being more efficient, they both produce more than they did in the status quo; the market price is therefore lower. Their individual profits at t are
Obviously, π L 1 >π 2 . Notice that the difference between π L 1 and π 2 is increasing in x: when only one firm enjoys a cost advantage, she obtains a larger market share while benefiting from a higher price-to-cost margin.
Moreover, notice that the instantaneous payoffs in (A.3), (A.5), and (A.7) fulfill Assumption 1.
When both firms have innovated, the social welfare is W 2 = 4(A + x) 2 9 , (A.8)
with W 2 > W 1 since A > x. When firms simultaneously invest in R&D, individual profits rise from (A.3) to (A.7), and welfare jumps from (A.4) to (A.8). Alternatively, firms may behave asymmetrically, so that one is an innovation leader and the other is a follower.
Under these circumstances, individual profits first change from to (A.3) to (A.5) (and welfare from (A.4) to (A.6)). Then, when the follower invests in R&D, the profit changes from (A.5) to (A.7) (and welfare from (A.6) to (A.8)).
